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ATTORNEYS IN DOUBT
JAMES E. STARRS*
N THE CONFRONTATION of competing issues, the actual practice of
law, the attorney becomes an adept interpreter or he does not thrive
at all. It is the peculiar function of this art of interpretation to illumine
the legal standards by which the conduct of others shall be governed.
This incessant travail after criteria seemingly would equip the attorney
most handsomely to meet the measure of those problems of individual
conscience and professional ethics which, all too often, arise to perplex
him. There is much, however, in the newspaper columns of late, in the
reports of disciplinary proceedings and in the forthright discourse of
the practitioner himself, to belie this suggestion.
Why, then, is it that attorneys are ill-prepared to interpret or define
their own ethical issues with the same competence that marks their
analysis and solution of other persons' legal problems? This ill-pre-
paredness, be it accepted, inheres not alone in an inability to perceive
or to resolve matters of professional conscience but, more commonly,
in a discomfiture in their presence. Concededly, the explanation for
much of this uneasiness is too psychologically deep-rooted to be dis-
lodged by any amount of persuasion here. Perhaps, notwithstanding,
the causes of much of the apparent insouciance of many active practi-
tioners to issues of professional ethics can be discerned from the narra-
tion and discussion of a cause cjl~bre which very nearly muddied the
Probate Court of Cook County, Illinois, recently.'
Attorneys A and B were consulted by a nonresident, X, with respect
to the probate of the allographic will of Max Roeder which had been
drafted and signed by another nonresident, Y, and the principal bene-
ficiary of which was the mother of nonresident Z. Upon hearing the
narrative of Y as to the circumstances under which he was asked to
draw the will, A and B immediately recognized the startling similarity
between the drafting of Max Roeder's will and another allographic will
which these same attorneys had. probated a year earlier for X and Z.
This previous will, of Kirstine Jepsen, in which the principal beneficiary
* A.B., LL.B., St. John's University; LL.M., New York University. Assistant
Professor of Law, DePaul University Law School.
1 In the Matter of Estate of Max Roeder, No. 614, Probate Court, Cook County,
Ill., 1960. Be it known in advance that my comments are in no wise intended to
reflect discredit upon the attorneys who were involved in this matter and that the
Probate Court of Cook County has completely exonerated them of any impro-
priety.
was the mother of X, had been written
by Z, and witnessed by Y. Both Jepsen
and Roeder were, according to the state-
ments of the scriveners of their wills, physi-
cally unable to draft their own wills. This
was due, in the case of Jepsen, to a fall
which necessitated the bandaging of her
arms and, as to Roeder, to the infirmity
of age and illness. Indeed, Jepsen and
Roeder, both foreign-born, were living in
the familyless atmosphere of a rooming or
boarding house when they directed that
their will be written. In both, the scribe
was almost a stranger to the deceased,
whereas all persons beneficially interested
in the probate of the wills were mutual
friends of long standing.
The immediate reaction of attorneys A
and B was that these similarities were too
extraordinary to be mere coincidences.
Consequently, they interrograted their cli-
ents in a rigorous and penetrating fashion
in order to discover the truth of the matter.
Their clients, however, did not falter un-
der the cross-examination and, instead,
convincingly reaffirmed their prior recitals.
Still in doubt, A and B referred the Roeder
will to a qualified examiner of questioned
documents and sent Y, the draftsman of
the Roeder will, for a polygraph examina-
tion. Although the report as to the will it-
self was favorable, the polygraph report
indicated that Y had not told the truth in
response to three significant questions.
Shortly thereafter, attorneys A and B, by
letter to X and Z, terminated their repre-
sentation of them in the matter of the
Roeder will.
The involvement of attorneys A and B
was not yet at an end for they were noti-
fied by X and Z that their letter of with-
drawal had not been received. Some time
later A and B received an unsolicited re-
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port from an out-of-state lie detector agency
which confirmed the truth of Y's state-
ments concerning the Roeder will. At this
juncture, A and B realized that their pre-
dicament had worsened since the nine-
month period for filing claims in the Roe-
der estate was about to expire. They feared
that, if their inaction barred what might be
the legitimate claim of Z, they could be
subjected to a suit to recover the third of
a million dollars thus lost.
Therefore, A and B directed X and Z to
attorneys C and D, experienced counsel in
probate matters, and thoroughly advised
substituted counsel of the patchwork of
circumstances, including, particularly, all
of their reservations and doubts as to the
validity of the Roeder will. Only after at-
torneys C and D decided to accept the case
was the fraud of X, Y, and Z and others
in the Jepsen and Roeder estates publicly
revealed. At no time prior to this disclo-
sure did any of the attorneys apprize the
Probate Court of Cook County of their un-
certainty as to the legitimacy of these wills.
The central concern in this factual set-
ting is readily perceived and easily stated.
Should attorneys A and B have disclosed
their doubts concerning the lawfulness of
the Roeder and Jepsen wills and their cli-
ents' conduct with respect to them to the
Probate Court of Cook County? Unfor-
tunately, the answer is not similarly appar-
ent, nor are the relevant criteri4 necessary
for its determination immediately ascertain-
able, nor for that matter, are they logically
reconcilable once revealed. But more of
that hereafter.
As Vinogradoff2 has explained, an indi-
vidual's activity within society is bounded
by various rules of conduct. The attorney
2 VINOGRADOFF, COMMON SENSE IN LAW 16-18
(3d ed. 1959).
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is by no means exempt. Of them, the "con-
ventional standard" or code of ethics, rules
of morality and legal duties, all urge their
respective, and as we shall see, at times
contradictory, mandates upon the behavior
of an attorney. Thus, each attorney is
aware of the binding force of the canons
of professional ethics in his own jurisdic-
tion.' Each also realizes that, apart from
the canons themselves, the courts have lev-
ied upon the attorney other obligations,
independently demanded for the security
of the legal order, e.g., the privilege of pro-
fessional secrecy. Fewer attorneys, how-
ever, appreciate and, if they do, acquiesce
in the unwritten commands of another or-
der, the moral one.4
But one ramification of these interlock-
ing rules for the governance of attorneys is
the very real possibility that problems of
conscience may be appraised and deter-
mined according to different standards.
This, of course, will lead inevitably to dis-
parate resolutions of identical problems, a
probable concomitant of which will be the
attorney's being at sea in the face of any
issue of right professional conduct. That
uncertainty, in its turn, may manifest itself
in professional apathy toward such prob-
lems in general and popular cynicism to-
ward the legal profession, With the result-
ant loss of that indispensable confidence
between attorney and client which these
rules, in large measure are designed to en-
courage.
In proof of the reasonable probability of
8 See generally BRAND, BAR ASSOCIATIONS, AT-
TORNEYS AND JUDGES (1956, Supp. 1959).
4Possibly this is attributable to the belief of at-
torneys that the sanction value of moral stric-
tures is more remote than that of the legal or
ethical order. Note the acid comments of Cur-
tis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV.
3 (1951).
these propositions, observe the operation
of these variant rules upon the factual pat-
tern presented. From any perspective, the
problem may ultimately be delimited as
one of secrecy for confidential communica-
tions between attorney and client. As Dean
Wigmore would have it, the privilege be-
tween attorney and client obtains:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is
sought (2) from a professional legal adviser
in his capacity as such, [and] (3) the com-
munications relating to that purpose, (4)
made in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the
legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
waived. 5
However, it has long been recognized that
the privilege does not exist where the cli-
ent seeks legal advice to assist him in the
commission of some crime or tort.6 In
truth, this is not so much an exception to
the rule of privilege as express recognition
that no privilege attaches in that instance,
for
In order that the rule may apply there must
be both professional confidence and profes-
sional employment, but if the client has a
criminal object in view in his communica-
tions with his solicitor one of these elements
must necessarily be absent. The client must
either conspire with his solicitor or deceive
him. If his criminal object is avowed, the
client does not consult his adviser profes-
sionally, because it cannot be the solicitor's
business to further any criminal object. If
the client does not avow his object he re-
poses no confidence, for the state of facts,
which is the foundation of the supposed
confidence, does not exist. 7
5 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
G Id. at § 2298; Gardner, The Crime or Fraud
Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47
A.B.A.J. 708 (1961).
7 Queen v. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. 153, 168 (1884).
Furthermore, the courts have consistent-
ly verbalized a distinction between revela-
tions concerning past criminal or tortious
conduct and crimes or torts yet in the off-
ing." In general, as to the former, no dis-
closure will be compelled. Judicial think-
ing is, however, quite to the contrary as to
crimes or torts in futuro.9 In light of the
particular factual setting in which attorneys
A and B were involved, it is necessary, fur-
ther, to be reminded of the dual nature of
an attorney's function. An attorney, in
axiomatic terms, is truly not only the advo-
cate and protector of his client but also of
justice itself. The practical dilemma, there-
fore, is to which value is the greater alle-
giance due.
Assume, for the nonce, that attorneys A
and B were convinced that X, Y, and Z
had perpetrated a fraud upon the probate
court in the probate of the Jepsen will and
that they intended to do so again with the
Roeder will. On this hypothesis, what
would the law ask of them? According to
the relevant principles as outlined, their
obligation would appear to be unambigu-
ous, namely, to maintain secrecy in the
Jepsen matter but to disclose, when re-
quired by the court, the details of the
Roeder will.
Our analysis, however, must go behind
untested rules. Why is it that these attor-
neys must not utter the words which will
unearth their clients' past wrongs? Wig-
more, 1' in voicing what would appear to be
the sentiment of the courts,1 ' argues in es-
8 SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.
D.C. 1948); Gebhardt v. United Rys., 220 S.W.
677, 679 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1920).
9 See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
10 8 WIGMORE, op. Cit. supra note 5, at § 2291.
11 Gebhardt v. United Rys., 220 S.W. 677 (Mo.
1920).
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sence that the culpable client is as equally
deserving of legal representation as the
innocent one, a possibility which would be-
come very remote if the attorney were re-
quired to disclose his client's admissions of
prior wrongdoing. This might very well be
so in the case of the client who is being
prosecuted for the crime at the time the
admission of guilt occurs. In fact, Wig-
more's position was stated in answer to
Bentham's strong indictment 12 of attorneys
who fail to inform upon a client they are then
defending against the charge with which
the disclosure is concerned. Indeed, such
was the situation which confronted Charles
Phillips, Esq.13 in his celebrated defense of
Courvoisier for the murder of Lord Rus-
sell in 1840, when, on the second day of
the trial, Courvoisier gave his attorney in-
controvertible proof of his guilt. Here Wig-
more's arguments may more understand-
ably justify a failure to disclose than under
the circumstances which, in our supposi-
tion, convinced attorneys A and B of the
past wrong of their clients.
In addition, Wigmore 14 considers the
revelation of past wrongdoing to be an act
of treachery, not lightly to be condoned
nor assumed by "any honorable man." 15
This position, of course, assumes that the
dishonor lies in an attorney's renunciation
of an implied promise to retain confidences
12 Set forth in 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note
5, at §2291.
13This case is discussed at length in SIARs-
WOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS
AND DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW
41, & app. I (1854). For an even more remark-
able actual situation, see ALLEN, ASPECTS OF
JUSTICE 239 (1958).
14 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 2291.
15 Even those who are presumptively dishon-
orable have such a code of honor. SUTHERLAND,
THE PROFESSIONAL THIEF 12 n.4 (1937).
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which his relation to the client "naturally
invites." ' Who is to say, however, that
the invitation to confide such affairs exists
at all? The probabilities are that one acting
in defense of a person accused of crime
might extend that implicit invitation, but
the same cannot be said of other occasions,
particularly when one recalls that even
Wigmore agrees1" that there is no dishonor
in disclosing prospective wrongdoing.
In sum, this sense of treachery argument
bears unmistakable reference to the popu-
lar abhorrence of the informer, be he paid
or not. How, indeed, can it be dishonor-
able for an attorney to inform upon his
client when the ethical directive to attor-
neys is to "expose without fear or favor
before the proper tribunals corrupt or dis-
honest conduct in the profession . . . ," I"
even when that knowledge was gained in
confidence? 19
Or is it rather that the basis for this re-
fusal to disclose past wrongs is the same as
that which justifies the existence of the
attorney-client privilege in the first place?
The raison d'6tre for the privilege has
been expressed by Lord Brougham20 in
felicitous language:
" 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
1 1d. at § 2298.
18 Canon 29, American Bar Association Can-
ons of Professional Ethics.
V, W.N. CROMWELL FOUNDATION, OPINIONS OF
THE COMMITTEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF
THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw
YORK AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS'
ASS'N 555 (1956). Contra, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 406
(1957).
20 Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Mylne & Keene 98
(1833), cited in SNYDER, GREAT OPINIONS OF
GREAT JUDGES 323, 328 (1883).
But it is out of regard to the interests of
justice, which cannot be upholden, and to
the administration of justice, which cannot
go on without the aid of men skilled in
jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts,
and in those matters affecting rights and
obligations which form the subject of all
judicial proceedings. If the privilege did
not exist at all, everyone would be thrown
upon his own legal resources; deprived of
all professional assistance, a man would not
venture to consult any skillful person, or
would only dare to tell his counselor half
his case....
But this contention, in effect, merely re-
states Wigmore's first argument and, as
such, is susceptible to the same riposte.
In the legal order, then, it is arguable
whether knowledge of past wrongs must be
forever locked in the memory of an attor-
ney as a general rule of practice in all
cases. The proper limit of such secrecy
may be that implicitly enunciated by Wig-
more, i.e., whenever the attorney discovers
the incriminating details as a consequence
of his defense of the client for the crime to
which the inculpative statements relate, no
disclosure shall be required.
On the other hand, little doubt exists in
the abstract with respect to the duty to
disclose future wrongdoing,2t especially
where that wrong pertains to the integrity
of the judicial process. Yet, how shall one
apply a rule requiring disclosure of con-
templated wrongs when, in a concrete in-
stance like the present, to abide by it is to
publicize past wrongs? The inherent prob-
lem cannot be masked by the fact that the
21 I re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 105 A.2d 395 (1954)
(continuing crime concept); Petition of Sawyer,
229 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1956); Abbott v. Superior
Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 19, 177 P.2d 317 (1st
Dist. 1947); Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N.J. Eq.
455, 21 Al. 1054 (Ch. 1891).
past crime in this situation might lawfully
be discoverable. And, were that the rule,
how could one conceal the unconsummated
wrong, since they are essentially continu-
ing wrongs?
Attorneys A and B, however, were not
convinced of their clients' guilt. Theirs
was but an unresolved doubt. What, then,
should they have done? The decisions
2 2
indicate that courts, in appraising the need
for disclosure, will be less concerned with
the subjective belief of the attorneys than
with the objective impression which the
circumstances create. In other words, if
the entire factual panorama, aliunde the
communications between attorney and cli-
ent, establishes to the court a prima facie
case of unlawful use of the attorney-client
relation, then disclosure will be compelled.
Mr. Justice Cardozo described a prima
facie case as one which gives color to the
charge of wrongdoing.2 3 An early Massa-
chusetts case 24 explained it as something
more than a mere suspicion of guilt. What-
ever the precise meaning, it would appear
that if A and B, knowing all the details,
conclude that there is reasonable doubt of
their clients' guilt, certainly the court, de-
prived of such essential information in its
appraisal, could not reasonably be expected
to do otherwise. In such event, no disclo-
sure would be mandated, apart from the
issue of past or future wrong.
Unlike the legal norms circumscribing
the attorney-client privilege, which rules,
operating at the behest of the court, either
22 SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C.
1948); State v. Barrows, 52 Conn. 323 (1884);
Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Goss, 50
Ga. 637, 179 S.E. 420 (1935); Nadler v.
Warner Co., 321 Pa. 139, 184 At. 3 (1936).
2 3 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 115 (1933).
24Highbee v. Dresser, 103 Mass. 523, 526
(1870).
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prohibit the attorney's voluntary disclosure
of confidential communications or compel
disclosure, the Canons of Professional Eth-
ics make demands of an attorney's profes-
sional conscience independent of, and
sometimes inconsistent with, the legal dic-
tate. In general, it is the function of the
canon to isolate the lawyer class from
others in society by imposing certain duties
upon its members not binding upon -other
individuals in society.25 Of these obliga-
tions, the duty to refrain from revealing the
confidences of a client has been said to be
"one of the duties that distinguishes a law-
yer from a layman." 26 If this be so, then
one might anticipate, as its corollary, that
the unique status of a lawyer, as champion
alike of client, court, law and justice, might
occasionally impress upon him a duty to
disclose his client's secrets. In fact, the
canons themselves bespeak such a respon-
sibility.27
To resolve the imbroglio of attorneys A
and B according to ethical standards, one
must perforce refer to Canon 37 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which de-
clares, in pertinent part:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his
client's confidences....
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is
not precluded from disclosing the truth in
respect to the accusation. The announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is
not included within the confidences which
he is bound to respect. He may properly
make such disclosures as may be necessary
to prevent the act or protect those against
whom it is threatened.
25 VINOGRADOFF, COMMON SENSE IN LAW 18
(3d ed. 1959).
26 ARCHER, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAW-
YER 36 (1910).
27 Canon 37 of the American Bar Association
Canons of Professional Ethics is construed as
liberally as the preamble permits.
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Yet Canon 37, like all the canons, must be
read in light of the preamble which asserts:
No code or set of rules can be framed,
which will particularize all the duties of the
lawyer in the varying phases of litigation
or in all the relations of professional life.
The following canons of ethics are adopted
by the American Bar Association as a gen-
eral guide, yet the enumeration of particular
duties should not be construed as a denial
of the existence of others equally impera-
tive, though not specifically mentioned.
In short, the canons are to be interpreted
in the spirit of the policy they were de-
signed to effectuate, i.e., professional be-
havior guided by sound and uniform prin-
ciples of right conduct.
A careful perusal of the opinions on
matters of professional ethics rendered by
the Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances of the American Bar Associa-
tion 218 and the Committees on Professional
Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York and the New York
County Lawyers' Association29 bears de-
cided witness to the liberal interpretation
to which Canon 37 has been subjected. A
cursory appraisal of Canon 37 would make
the need for such analysis evident. "The
announced intention," it is said, "of a cli-
ent to commit a crime is not included with-
in the confidences which he is bound to re-
spect." Was this exception meant to ex-
clude announced admissions of past guilt?
And what about disclosures concerning fu-
ture torts? What is the significance of the
word "announced"? Does it indicate that
when the attorney discovers that his client
contemplates the commission of a future
28 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, op. cit. supra
note 19.
29W.N. CROMWELL FoUNDATION, op. cit. supra
note 19.
crime from sources other than the client
himself, he may not disclose that informa-
tion or does it rather mean that Canon 37
does not prohibit disclosures when such
knowledge is thus gained?
With almost unflagging consistency, the
opinions on ethics of the American Bar
Association Committee on Professional
Ethics and Grievances have invoked the
mandate of Canon 37 to recommend
against disclosure of confidences when to
do so would reveal a client's past crime.30
In reaching these decisions, the committee
has not discussed the inquiries either on
their own individual merits or in depth, but
instead has been content to cite Canon 37,
almost as if it were impenetrable dogma.
In Opinion 23,31 we do, however, find
the cryptic statement that "it is in the public
interest that even the worst criminal should
have counsel. . .. " Yet, if counsel dis-
closes the whereabouts of a client who,
while awaiting trial on a criminal charge,
jumps bail, is the client thereby denied
counsel when charged with the crime of
bail jumping? Certainly not - separate
crimes and separate occasions of defense
are involved. Or is it rather that an attor-
ney who makes such a disclosure will be
prevented thereafter from exerting his best
efforts in behalf of his client, since the cli-
ent will no longer repose trust in him? This
argument, of course, merely reverts to the
timeworn adage: no duty not to disclose
-no confidence; no confidence-no legal
representation; no legal representation-
no administration of justice.12
s0 Opinions 155 and 156 are exceptions. See
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, op. cit. supra note
19, at 322, 324.
31 Id. at 99.
32 The classic rationale was given in Opinion
91 as follows: "The reason for the rule lies in
And what, you ask, is fatal in this proc-
ess of reasoning? Just this: the argument
rests squarely upon a pure speculation, i.e.,
absent a duty not to disclose, clients will
not unreservedly entrust their secrets to
their attorneys. This supposition, to my
mind, concedes much too much practical
efficacy to the ethical duty imposed by
Canon 37. Whatever the power of the
evidentiary privilege against disclosure to
induce confidence, no attorney who has
represented more than one person accused
of crime would be likely to urge that the
ethical duty of Canon 37 either was known
to or so impressed his client that an inti-
mate bond of trust magically arose to waft
away the shroud of secrecy. On the con-
trary, confidence is "a plant of slow growth"
springing rather from "the perception, by
others, of your purity and elevation of
character, your modest, manly, sedateness
of habits and demeanor, your thorough
knowledge of business, your incorruptible
integrity .... ,,33
Moreover, if a disclosure of past crimes
will diminish the confidence between at-
torney and client, then a similar diminution
should result from the disclosure of the
"announced intention of a client to commit
a crime." Or is it that a different and more
imperious value demands protection against
future crimes than exists as to past crimes?
If so, let it be said. The objection is not
so much to the lack of a reason for the rule
but to the failure to subject the rule to the
type of penetrating analysis which lawyers
the fact that it is essential to the administration
of justice that there should be perfect freedom
of consultation by client with attorney without
any apprehension of a compelled disclosure by the
attorney to the detriment of the client." Id. at
202.
33
"WARREN, MORAL AND PROFESSIONAL DUTIES
OF ATTORNEYS 200 (2d. ed. 1851).
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otherwise require. When instinctive ac-
ceptance is substituted for intellectual skep-
ticism, it is no wonder that attorneys look
askance at the Canons of Professional
Ethics.
The opinions on professional ethics of
the American Bar Association Committee
and the New York City and New York
County Committees do not establish with
certainty whether the "announced intention"
exception of Canon 37 embraces future
torts as well as future crimes. In Opinion
155 of the American Bar Association
Committee, 3' any contemplated unlawful
act is said to be subject to disclosure but
that statement was dictum only, if a digres-
sion in such an opinion may be so char-
acterized, and Opinion 28735 refused to
adhere to the decision in Opinion 155.
Furthermore, the language of Opinion
202,36 again dictum, would limit Canon 37
to future crimes only. However, Opinion
53 of the New York County Committee,3 7
declared that a collusive agreement to se-
cure the running of the statute of limita-
tions may be exposed.
The conclusion is inescapable, after
evaluating all the American Bar Associa-
tion Committee's interpretations of Canon
37, that, in their understanding, only an
announced intention to commit a future
crime may be disclosed. One may doubt
that a future crime, for the purposes of
Canon 37, is distinguishable from a future
tort or, for that matter, any future unlaw-
ful act, if the value supporting the future
crime exception is some general notion like
3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 322.
35 Id. at 609.
36 Id. at 406.
37W.N. CROMWELL FOUNDATION, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 542.
ATTORNEYS IN DOUBT
the attorney's obligation to society and its
members.
Under these constructions of their ethi-
cal duty, attorneys A and B might, in good
conscience, keep their doubts silent con-
cerning X, Y and Z's past conduct in the
probate of the Jepsen will. So too, with
respect to the Roeder will, if the "an-
nounced intention" exception of Canon 37
bears its literal meaning and if no other
canon otherwise prevails. In Opinion 268
of the American Bar Association Commit-
tee,38 the inquiry presented facts indicating
that attorney C, after advising client X that
he failed to meet the residence require-
ments for a divorce suit, learned that attor-
ney D was bringing a divorce suit for client
X, in which client X had misstated these
jurisdictional facts. The committee deter-
mined that attorney C must preserve the
confidences of client X, but, although it
could have done so under Canon 37, did
not predicate its opinion on the unan-
nounced nature of attorney C's informa-
tion. However, Opinion 84 of the New
York County Committee" takes a contrary
stand on essentially similar facts.
The words "announced intention" recol-
lect those early decisions in which it was
asserted that the evidentiary privilege of
attorney-client did not obtain when a fu-
ture crime or tort was in contemplation at
the moment of the attorney-client relation,
whether or not that contemplation was an-
nounced.4 0 That view has recently been
3I AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 557.
39 W.N. CROMWELL FOUNDATION, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 559.
40 United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939); Standard
Fire Ins. Co. v. Smithhart, 183 Ky. 679, 211
S.W. 441 (1919).
discredited. 4 1 The Canon 37 exception
may be but its uninterred vestige. Thus
may the word "intention" be explained.
"Announced," it may be, is its modifier
since only those matters communicated by
the client to his attorney are within the pur-
view of Canon 37.42
Even though Canon 37 may not itself
permit disclosure, some other canon or
policy may do so. When conflicts among
the canons arise, which canon shall con-
trol? In the eyes of the American Bar As-
sociation Committee, Canon 37 transcends
all other canons, even though the result
may be a failure to disclose a past perjury
of one's client, 43 past misdeeds of a fellow
attorney,44 or a future fraud upon the
court.
45
These opinions must be read in conjunc-
tion with Opinion 25040 which came to the
astounding conclusion that, in order to pro-
tect an attorney's right to his fee, disclosure
of confidential communications is permissi-
ble in a suit against the former client to
recover the fee. One must, when confront-
ed by such blatant incongruity, grudgingly
admit the point of Felix Cohen's jibe that
".. . legal ethics centers about the prob-
lem of how to secure a larger income for
lawyers." I Fortunately, the judicial deci-
41 See In re Koellen's Estate, 167 Kan. 676,
208 P.2d 595 (1959).
42 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 617. Cf., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TON, op. cit. supra note 19, at 99.
43 Id. at 617 (Canons 41, 29, 22 notwithstand-
ing).
41Id. at 406 (Canon 29 notwithstanding).
Contra, W. N. CROMWELL FOUNDATION, OP. Cit.
supra note 19, at 555.
45 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 557.
40 Id. at 498. Contra, W. N. CROMWELL FOUN-
DATION, Op. cit. supra note 19, at 76, 278, 531.
47 COHEN, MODERN ETHICS AND THE LAW IN THE
LEGAL CONSCIENCE 18 (1960).
sions are of a mind that the attorney's
duty to the court supersedes his duty to
his client, when they come into conflict.48
No uniformly warm endorsement for
the infusion of moral precepts into the law
has been decreed by legal scholars.45 The
canons of ethics do, however, signify that
the lawyer's duty in its last analysis is in-
extricably bound to "the strictest principles
of moral law."55 To some these principles
of moral law are ultimately derived from
the natural law which denotes a natural
right of speech.51 In that view, if the com-
municator were not able to demand silence
of the confidant, to whom h6 entrusts his
secrets, then the natural right of speech
would be gravely abridged. Such a funda-
mental right is expressly recognized by the
Turkish Constitution of 1961 in which it
is declared that "every individual is entitled
to the right of free communication. The pri-
vacy of communication is essential. "52
This duty to maintain professional secrecy
has also been attributed to the dictates of
commutative and legal justice, by which
secrecy is demanded for the good of the
individual and the good of the commu-
nity. 53
Moralists, however, do impose certain
48 State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Niklaus,
149 Neb. 859, 33 N.W.2d 145 (1948); In re
Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951).
49 A recent exponent of the wall of separation
theory is Carrington, The Moral Quality of the
Criminal Law, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 575 (1960).
50 Canon 32, American Bar Association Canons
of Professional Ethics.
51' Regan & Macartney, Professional Secrecy and
Privileged Communications, 2 CATHOLIC LAW-
YER 3, 4 (1956) citing AQUINAS, SUMMA THEO-
LOGICA, 11-11, q. 70, art. 1, ad. 2.
5 1 TURKISH CONST. art. 17 (1961).
53 Regan & Macartney, supra note 51, at 4;
PROMMER, HANDBOOK OF MORAL THEOLOGY 135
(1957); McHUGH AND CALLAN, MORAL THE-
OLOGY §2414 (1960).
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very limited conditions upon the retention
of entrusted secrets between attorney and
client., 4 In the case of consummated
wrongs, the attorney is under no moral
obligation to inform on his client, since in
justice the client has a right to reputation,
even though that be an inaccurate portray-
al of his character.5 5 The legal order, it is
worth noting, has not been so ardent a
guardian of the private right to an evil
reputation nor even of the private right to
a good reputation where the disclosure of
alleged past improprieties is challenged.56
Others assert that a climate of informing
is detrimental to the well-being of society. 7
This is a particularly intriguing observation
when compared to Section 584 of the Illi-
nois Criminal Code of 1959 which had
long declared one an accessory after the
fact who, knowing that a crime had been
committed, conceals such knowledge from
a magistrate.58 The new criminal code
couples an "intent to prevent the appre-
hension of the offender" with such conceal-
ment, freeing an attorney of a potential
clash of duties.59
The moral obligation of secrecy may be
liberated by the "urgent necessity of ...
public or private good," 60 which may
arise, for our purposes, from a threatened
harm to the community, or to an innocent
third person. Legal justice, it is said, com-
pels disclosure when the security of the
54' Connery, The Right to Silence, 39 MARQ. L.
REV. 180, 185 (1956).
55Regan & Macartney, supra note 51, at 4;
MCHUGH AND CALLAN, op. cit. supra note 53,
at §2409; Connery, supra note 54,'at 187.
5r See PROSSER, TORTS 607 (2d ed. 1955) for a
description of absolute and qualified privileges
in the law of civil defamation.
5T Connery, supra note 54, at 187.
5 1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §584 (1959).
59 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §31-5 (1961).
C0 PROMMER, op. cit. supra note 53, at 135.
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community is grievously in jeopardy. Char-
ity to one's neighbor, on the other hand,
obliges one to reveal intended serious harm
to an individual. In both cases, however,
the issue becomes one of the degree of
gravity required for disclosure.
Such notable disagreement has been re-
flected by moralists in the attempted solu-
tion of this problem that it is unclear
whether the possibility of perjury by cli-
ents X, Y and Z would constitute a suffi-
ciently aggravated harm to society and to
the rightful beneficiaries of the Roeder will
to obligate disclosure. 6' In any event, at-
torneys A and B would not be morally
bound to disclose when, in conscience,
they entertained doubts not only as to
their obligation to disclose but as to the
conduct of their clients as well, particu-
larly in light of the reasonable but ineffec-
tive efforts they expended to dispel these
doubts .12
The problem of disclosure confronting
attorneys A and B merely exemplifies the
fact that, and the manner in which, the
daily pursuits of an attorney may be
caught tip by the kaleidoscope of law,
ethics and morality. Although varying
shades of complexity grip each dilemma,
61Regan & Macartney, supra note 51, at 8 for
authorities pro and contra.
62 PROjMMER, op. cit. supra note 53, at 64. But
an English barrister, in advising law students
and young attorneys, says that, "if you are not
sure whether something should be disclosed or
not, disclose it." CECIL, BRIEF TO COUNSEL 92
(1958).
the ultimate inquiry remains the same. To
which order, be it legal, ethical, or moral
(not that there is any necessary inconsist-
ency among them), shall the attorney con-
form his conduct? The impact of that
contest upon the attorney's conscience is
a reminder that "there is no worse torture
than the torture of laws."'' 3
Yet the statement of one issue but puts
the situation in perspective. Other equally
troublesome problems clamor for recogni-
tion and resolution. What are the relevant
norms of the legal, ethical and moral or-
ders? Are these norms altered by the tides
of divergent circumstances? Are they con-
sistent among themselves or, in fact, is it
desirable that they be so? The multiplica-
tion of uncertainties serves only as an in-
troduction to the core of the dilemma. To
its solution must be applied the accom-
plished interpretative skills of the attorney,
not least among which is an appraisal of
the contrapuntal relationship of the attor-
ney to society and to the larger dictates of
justice itself. In fine, "it is always some-
thing to see where the difficulty lies, al-
though it should be insuperable.
And it should be some solace to the attor-
ney to appreciate that "uncertainty is the
lot of every branch of thought and knowl-
edge when verging on the ultimate." 65
G3 Bacon, Of Judicature, 2 THE WORLD OF LAW
566 (1960).
61 Bentham, The Influence of Time and Place in
Matters of Legislation, Ch. 2, 1 WORKS 171, 178.
6; CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 135
(1928).
